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Abstract Socially anxious feelings sharply increase during
adolescence and such feelings have been associated with
interpretive biases. Studies in adults have shown that
interpretive biases can be modified using Cognitive Bias
Modification procedures (CBM-I) and subsequent effects
on anxiety have been observed. The current study was
designed to examine whether the CBM-I procedure has
similar effects in adolescents. Unselected adolescents were
randomly allocated to either a positive interpretation
training (n=88) or a placebo-control condition (n=82).
Results revealed that the training was successful in
modifying interpretations and effects generalized to a new
task. The interpretive bias effects were most pronounced in
individuals with a threat-related interpretive bias at pre-test.
No effects on state anxiety were observed. The current
findings are promising with regard to applying bias
modification procedures to adolescents, while further
research is warranted regarding emotional effects.
Keywords Interpretive bias.Cognitive bias modification.
Anxiety.Adolescence
Introduction
Social anxiety and social phobia have a great impact on
daily life functioning in youth; individuals feel anxious in
social situations and the avoidance of a broad range of
situations causes detriments to children’s social and
academic functioning (Woodward and Fergusson 2001).
Specifically, the adolescent period is characterized by a
strong increase in fear of negative social evaluation relative
to a consistent decrease in general fears (Westenberg et al.
2007). Furthermore, social phobia, the clinical form of
social anxiety, typically has its onset in adolescence (age of
onset between 10 and 16.6 years, Wittchen and Fehm
2003). The course of social phobia is chronic and it has been
shown that the strongest predictor of recovery is late age of
onset of social fears (DeWit et al. 1999), underscoring the
need for (preventive) interventions directed at social fears in
children and adolescents.
Cognitive models of anxiety propose that the tendency to
interpret ambiguous information as threatening plays a
causal role in the etiology and maintenance of pathological
anxiety (Beck et al. 1985). There is overwhelming evidence
in adults that such threat-related interpretive biases and
anxiety are related (Mathews and MacLeod 1994) and such
evidence is accumulating in children and adolescents.
Hadwin et al. (1997), for example, revealed that anxiety is
associated with threat-related interpretations in a non-
selected (i. e. selection was not based on specific criteria)
sample of children (7 to 9-years-old). Bögels and Zigterman
(2000) showed that in a clinical sample, children and
adolescents with an anxiety disorder (separation anxiety,
social phobia, or generalized anxiety) interpreted ambiguous
situations as more negative than children with externalizing
problems (clinical control group) or a non-clinical control
group (mean age entire sample=12.5 years). The role of a
negative interpretive bias regarding social information in
socially anxious adolescents has also been demonstrated;
high socially anxious adolescents (mean age 13.6 years)
interpreted short scenarios regarding social interactions as
more negative than adolescents with an average level of
social anxiety (Miers et al. 2008). This relationship between
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be moderated by age; interpretive bias seems to be
associated with anxiety in older children (above 11 years),
but less so in younger children (Cannon and Weems 2010;
Weems et al. 2001). The evidence for the influence of gender
on the relationship between interpretive bias and anxiety is
more mixed. While several studies have shown that gender
did not moderate the link between interpretive bias and
anxiety (Leitenberg et al. 1986; Weems et al. 2001, 2007), a
recent study showed that interpretive bias was significantly
related to anxiety disorder status for females, but not for
males (Cannon and Weems 2010).
It is assumed that this threat-related interpretive bias is
not an incidental epiphenomenon of anxiety, but that it
plays a causal role in the maintenance and the development
of an anxiety disorder (Beck et al. 1985; Muris and Field
2008). While correlational studies presented above con-
firmed the relationship between interpretive bias and
anxiety, studies with a pure experimental design are
necessary to confirm the causal relationship. In adults,
there is now sound empirical evidence that a threat-related
interpretive bias can causally influence anxiety. Mathews
and Mackintosh (2000) developed a Cognitive Bias
Modification procedure to modify interpretations (CBM-I)
in adults. Participants read short ambiguous social scenarios
that ended with a word fragment requiring solution. Correct
solution of the fragment disambiguated the story either
positively or negatively, depending on the assigned condi-
tion. In this way, participants in the positive CBM-I
condition were trained to impose positive interpretations
on ambiguous information, while participants in the
negative condition were trained to interpret such informa-
tion in a negative way. The computer program proved to be
successful in modifying interpretive biases and subsequent
effects on anxiety were observed, providing evidence
consistent with a causal link between interpretive bias and
anxiety. It appears to be a robust finding, as the effects have
been replicated several times in adult samples of unselected
individuals (Holmes et al. 2006; Salemink et al. 2007b) and
effects have been observed on interpretive bias 24 h later
(Yiend et al. 2005). The ability to modify threat-related
interpretive biases with effects on anxiety not only has
important theoretical implications (causality), but also
important clinical implications. In adults, it has been shown
that training individuals with high levels of anxiety to
interpret ambiguous information in a positive way using
CBM-I reduced their negative interpretive bias and associated
self-reported anxious feelings (Mathews et al. 2007;M u r p h y
et al. 2007; Salemink et al. 2009).
There are three recent studies that have examined
modification of interpretive bias in children (Muris et al.
2008, 2009; Vassilopoulos et al. 2009). Children in Muris
et al.’s( 2008) study completed a computer game “Space
odyssey” that consisted of an imaginary journey to an
unknown planet. During the journey they encountered
different ambiguous situations that can be interpreted in a
positive or negative way. Children in the positive training
condition received reinforcement for choosing positive
outcomes, whereas children in the negative training
condition received reinforcement for choosing negative
outcomes. Results revealed that interpretive bias was
successfully modified using this CBM-I procedure and that
increase in negative interpretations was particularly pro-
nounced in children with high levels of anxiety (Muris et al.
2008). These CBM-I effects in children were later replicated,
without replicating the moderating effects of pre-training
anxiety (Muris et al. 2009). In addition, training affected
avoidance tendencies; children in the negative training
condition placed themselves further away from new situations
and objects on a map depicting the new planet. This suggests
generalization of the trained interpretive bias, which is
interesting, as there are inconsistent findings regarding
generalization to other tasks and domains in adults (Salemink
et al. 2007b, 2010a). Note however that effects on anxiety
were not investigated and changes in interpretations were
quite small (partial η
2≤0.05). The latter could possibly be due
to the relative young age of these children (first study:
10.0 years; second study: 10.7 years), as negative interpretive
biases appear to be related to anxiety in older children
(>11 years, Cannon and Weems 2010). Vassilopoulos et al.
(2009) selected high socially anxious children, who were
trained over three sessions to endorse positive rather than
negative interpretations. Again it was shown that CBM-I
training was successful in changing interpretations, and,
more importantly, children in the training condition showed
reduced trait social anxiety. Taken together, these findings in
children are promising with regard to the modification of
interpretations and effects on anxiety.
The goal of the current study was to examine whether
CBM-I can modify interpretations and anxiety in adolescents.
CBM-I is a computerized training to modify threat-related
interpretivebiasesthathas proventobeeffective inadultsand
promising in children. In the current study, CBM-I was
applied to adolescents, as adolescence is characterized by a
sharp increase is social anxiety (Westenberg et al. 2007)a n d
specifically in this age period, anxiety is associated with
threat-related interpretive biases (Cannon and Weems 2010).
The first aim was to examine whether CBM-I can modify
threat-related interpretations in adolescents. Therefore,
adolescents were randomly allocated to either a positive
CBM-I condition to learn to interpret ambiguous social
information in a more positive way or to a placebo-control
condition. The second aim was to examine generalization
of the modified interpretive bias to a new task containing
new stimuli. A recognition task was presented before and
after CBM-I to examine generalization of the trained
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might influence CBM-I effects. As previous research with
children has shown that level of anxiety could moderate the
effects of training (Muris et al. 2008), pre-training levels of
trait anxiety and interpretive bias were assessed. The final
aim was to examine the effects of CBM-I on state anxiety.
Itwashypothesizedthat1)followingtraining,adolescentsin
the positive condition would interpret ambiguous information
significantly more positive and less negative than adolescents
in the placebo-control condition, when controlling for age and
gender. It was also hypothesized that 2) trained interpretive bias
would generalize to a new task and 3) that pre-training level of
trait anxiety and interpretive bias would moderate the effects of
training. Lastly, 4) we predicted that adolescents in the positive
training condition would feel less anxious following training




adolescents from a class level were invited to participate. The
sample consisted of 170 adolescents (79 boys and 91 girls)
drawn from a public secondary school (two education levels:
“havo”: senior general secondary education and “vwo”:
pre-university education) in the Netherlands. Adolescents
ranged inage from 14–16years (M=14.5,SD=0.5) and 98.2%
was born in the Netherlands. The study was approved by
University of Amsterdam’s Ethical Committee (Department of
Developmental Psychology) and passive informed parental
consent was obtained for all participating adolescents.
Participants were randomly allocated to either the
positive CBM-I (n=88) or the placebo-control (n=82)
condition. For ethical reasons, the positive training condition
was not compared to a negative training condition. Due to
technical difficulties (losing connection with the server that
ran E-prime), the computer program sometimes stopped,
resulting in lost data. Twelve participants were lost between
the start of the experiment and the end of CBM-I, resulting in
158 adolescents who finished the complete CBM-I program
and the post-training state anxiety assessment (81 participants
inthe positivetrainingconditionand 77inthe placebocontrol
condition). In total, 144 adolescents completed the second
recognition task, thus generalisability effects were analyzed
for these 144 participants (75 participants in the positive
training condition and 69 in the placebo control condition).
1
Materials
CBM-I A social scenario-based training was used to
modify interpretive bias (Mathews and Mackintosh 2000).
Dutch scenarios that were successfully used in previous
experiments with non-selected adults (Salemink et al.
2007b) were modified to reflect social situations that are
relevant for young adolescents. A small pilot study
confirmed the age appropriateness of the scenarios. The
training consisted of five blocks of 10 scenarios that were
presented on a personal computer. In each block, participants
in the positive CBM-I group received eight positive
modification scenarios and two probe scenarios, while
participants in the placebo-control condition received four
valenced scenarios (two positive and two negative), four
neutral scenarios, and two probe scenarios. The modification
scenarios were created to train participants to make a positive
emotional interpretation of an initially ambiguous social
situation. Each scenario consisted of three lines that were
ambiguous in terms of valence. In the final sentence, a word
was left out of the sentence. After disappearance of the
scenario, the omitted word was presented as a word fragment
and disambiguated the scenario in a positive way. Participants
were instructed to press a spacebar when they felt they
knew what the word was, and then to press the key
corresponding to the first missing letter. This ensured that
the time taken to respond to the word was not contaminated
by variance in the time taken to locate the correct letter key.
The computer program only continued when a correct
response was given. Following the solution of the word
fragment, a comprehension question appeared that could
extend to future emotional implications beyond those
actually stated in the scenario. Participants answered the
question by pressing Y for yes and N for no.T h e y
subsequently received feedback (correct vs. wrong answer)
to reinforce the interpretation. An example of a modification
scenario, with the completed word fragment in parentheses,
is as follows:
Y o ua r ew o r k i n go nas c h o o la s s i g n m e n tw i t hs o m eo t h e r
children at your house. You turn on your favorite music
and based on their reactions, you understand that they
...... your choice of music.
l-ke (like)
Then the comprehension fragment followed:
Did your friends approve of your choice of music?
Participants in the placebo-control condition received two
positive and two negative scenarios. In the negative variant
of the previous example, participants would for example
receive ‘disl-ke’ (dislike). Participants in this placebo-
control condition also received neutral scenarios that had
1 Analyses regarding reaction time and state anxiety were repeated on
the smaller complete set of 144 participants. The same pattern of
results was observed, albeit not always reaching significance,
presumably due to reduced power.
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An example is as follows:
After the summer holidays, you are going back to
school.
As you arrive, you cannot help noticing
that the outside of the school has been
pa-nt-d (painted)
Has your school changed its appearance?
Test of Interpretive Bias: Reaction Times Probe scenarios
were included in the training procedure to assess change in
interpretation style. Probe scenarios were also three-lines in
length and described an initially ambiguous situation.
However, both groups received the same probe scenarios
with the same word fragments; one positive and one
negative valenced word fragment per block, resulting in a
total of five positive and five negative probes. The speed of
correctly resolving these probe word fragments was the
dependent measure (CBM-I effects on interpretive bias).
Test of Generalization: Recognition Test To assess generaliza-
tion of modified interpretive bias to a new task containing
new scenarios, participants completed a recognition task
before and after CBM-I. Each task consisted of two parts
with part two being the actual assessment of interpretive
bias. In part one, seven ambiguous social scenarios were
presented (different scenarios were used for the pre- and
post-trainingtest).Eachscenariohadatitleandconsistedof
three lines. A word was missing in the final sentence that
was presented as a word fragment after pressing the space
bar. Again, participants were asked to complete the
fragment as quickly as possible, yet the valence of the
story remained ambiguous. Afterwards, a comprehension
question with relevant feedback appeared on the screen and
participants were asked to answer the question.
In the second part of the recognition test, participants
saw the title of the ambiguous scenario, this time together
with two interpretations of the scenario; a positive
interpretation and negative interpretation. Participants rated
each sentence independently for its similarity in meaning to
the original scenario (presented in part one). A 4-point scale
was used, ranging from 1 (very different)t o4( very similar).
Endorsement of positive versus negative interpretations in
this second part was the dependent measure (generalization
of CBM-I effects to the recognition task).
Anxiety Assessment Aspreviousstudies withadultsobserved
effects of interpretation training on state anxiety (a transitory
anxious state) assessed with the Spielberger State Trait
Inventory (STAI, Mathews et al., 2007; Mathews and
Mackintosh 2000), state anxiety in the current study was
assessed with the Dutch State version of the State Trait
Anxiety Inventory for Children (ZBV-K, Bakker et al. 1989;
STAI-C, Spielberger 1973). Pre-training level of trait anxiety
(the stable tendency to react with anxious feelings to a
stressful situation) was assessed with the Dutch Trait version
of the STAI-C (Bakker et al. 1989;S p i e l b e r g e r1973).
Procedure
The experiment took place in the school’s computer room.
Participants were informed about the procedure and that
specific task instructions would appear on the computer
screen. The computer-program (E-prime version 2.0)
presented the STAI-C trait and state questionnaire first.
Participants then completed the first recognition task.
2
Afterwards, they were randomly assigned to either the
positive CBM-I condition or the placebo-control condition.
Participants were specifically instructed to imagine
themselves in each of the presented situations. An option for
rest was given after each block, resulting in four short breaks.
After CBM-I, participants completed the STAI-C state for the
secondtimeandcompletedthesecondrecognitiontask.Atthe




We examined the relationship between interpretive bias,
anxiety, gender, and age (assessed before CBM-I) using
correlational analyses (n=158, see Table 1). A pre-training
interpretive bias index was calculated by subtracting mean
similarity scores of positive interpretations from mean
similarity scores of negative interpretations, with positive
scores indicating a threat-related interpretive bias. Results
indicated that interpretive bias scores were positively
associated with trait and state anxiety, revealing that,
consistent with previous findings, higher levels of anxiety
were associated with a stronger threat-related interpretive
bias. In addition, gender was significantly correlated with
trait and state anxiety; females reported more state and trait
anxious feelings. Furthermore, gender was also significantly
correlated with pre-training interpretive bias; girls had
stronger threat-related interpretations than boys. When
directly comparing male and female adolescents, it was
shown that female adolescents felt significantly more
2 A subgroup (n=67) received a colour-word Stroop task before and
after training. This task is not part of the presented study and will not
be reported. Stroop task (performed yes vs. no) was added as an
additional between-subjects factor to the analyses to examine whether
this interacted with the main findings. It did not, p-values>0.36.
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p=0.006, d=0.5 (state anxiety girls M=30.4, SD=3.7 vs.
boys M=28.8, SD=3.6) and t(156)=4.0, p<0.001, d=0.6
(trait anxiety girls M=31.5, SD=6.3 vs. boys M=27.8,
SD=5.5). Furthermore, female adolescents also had a
significantly stronger negative interpretive bias compared to
males, t(150)=2.4, p=0.02, d=0.4(girlsM=0.30, SD=0.6 vs.
boys M=0.04, SD=0.7).
Effects of CBM-I on Interpretive Bias (Hypothesis 1)
Regarding reaction time analyses, reaction time data were
excluded if the response to the probe word fragment (0.3%) or
comprehension question (13.4%) was incorrect or if the latency
w a sl e s st h a n2 0 0m s( 1 . 1 % ) .O ne participant lost all the
reaction time data for the negative probes and was excluded
from the analyses. Participants in the positive and placebo-
control condition did not differ significantly in the percentage
of incorrect responses to probe word fragments, t(155)=1.0,
p=0.30 (Mpositive=0.1, SD=1.1 vs. Mplacebo=0.4, SD=1.9)
nor to probe comprehension questions, t(155)=−0.4, p>0.50
(Mpositive=13.9, SD=13.8 vs. Mplacebo=13.0, SD=13.7).
Exploration of the distribution of the reaction time variables
(boxplot and absolute z-scores) revealed 5 outliers that were
removed from the analyses (z-score >2.58), resulting in 152
participants with 77 participants in the positive training
condition and 75 in the placebo control condition.
To test whether the CBM-I procedure was effective in
influencing interpretations in adolescents, the reaction time
data was subjected to a 2 (Condition: positive training vs.
placebo control condition) x 2 (Valence probe: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (Gender) mixed model ANCOVA with age as
the covariate. Gender was included as an additional
between-subjects variable as it is known from the literature
that girls are more vulnerable for the development of
internalizing problems (Craske 2003) and as gender was
correlated with both interpretive bias and anxiety in the
current study. Age was added as a covariate to the analysis
as age differences in the relationship between anxiety and
interpretive bias have been observed (Cannon and Weems
2010). This analysis revealed the predicted Condition x
Valence interaction effect, F(1, 147)=10.9, p=0.001, ηp
2=
0.07 (for means and standard deviations, see Table 2).
Positively trained adolescents were quicker to solve positive
than negative word fragments t(76)=−4.3, p<0.001, d=0.5,
while adolescents in the placebo-control condition did not
differ significantly in their responses to positive and negative
solutions of the ambiguous scenario, t(74)=0.4, p>0.50,
d=0.05. Direct comparison of the two conditions revealed
that adolescents trained to interpret information positively
were significantly faster to complete positive probes com-
pared to individuals who followed the placebo-control
training, t(150)=2.6, p=0.01, d=0.4. The groups did not
differ significantly from each other in solving negative
probes, t(150)=−0.1, p>0.50, d=0.02. No other significant
main or interaction effects, including gender and age (p-
values>0.13) were observed. Thus, it was shown that the
cognitive bias modification procedure was effective in
modifying interpretations of ambiguous social situations in
adolescents.
Generalization of CBM-I (Hypothesis 2)
In the recognition task data, five participants were
identified as outliers and excluded, resulting in n=139
participants who completed both the pre- and post-training
recognition task (n=73 in the positive training condition
and n=66 in the placebo-control condition). To examine
generalization of CBM-I to a new task containing new
ambiguous information, a 2×2×2×2 mixed model
ANCOVA was conducted on the recognition test data with
condition and gender as between-subjects variables, valence
(positive vs. negative interpretations) and time (pre- vs. post
training) as the within-subject variables, and age as the
covariate. Results revealed a significant Condition x
Valence interaction effect, F(1, 134)=4.5, p=0.04, ηp
2=
0.03, qualified by a significant Condition x Valence x Time
interaction effect, F(1, 134)=19.6, p<0.001, ηp
2=0.13 (see
Table 2). No other significant main or interaction effects,
including gender and age were observed. The three-way
interaction effect was decomposed by analyzing positive
and negative interpretations separately. In addition to main
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Interpretive bias –
2. Trait anxiety 0.31** –
3. State anxiety 0.25** 0.52** –
4. Gender −0.20* −0.30** −0.22* –
5. Age 0.06 −0.11 −0.16 0.07 –
M 0.17 29.7 29.6 81 female / 14.5
77 male
SD 0.7 6.2 3.7 0.5
Table 1 Correlations, means,
and standard deviations for
interpretive bias, anxiety, gender
and age at pre-training
assessment (n=158)
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
J Abnorm Child Psychol (2011) 39:967–976 971effects of Condition (negative interpretation: F(1, 137)=5.2,
p=0.02, ηp
2=0.04) and Time (positive interpretations: F(1,
137)=40.1, p<0.001, ηp
2=0.23; negative interpretations: F
(1, 137)=18.0, p<0.001, ηp
2=0.12), significant Condition x
Time interaction effects were observed for both positive
and negative interpretations; respectively F(1, 137)=7.2,
p=0.008, ηp
2=0.05 and F(1, 137)=20.8, p<0.001, ηp
2=0.13.
Before the start of the training, there were no significant
differences between the groups in positive, t(137)=0.8,
p=0.41, d=0.1, and negative interpretations, t(137)=−1.1,
p=0.27, d=0.2, as intended. More importantly, after
training groups differed significantly in their positive
interpretations, t(137)=−2.5, p=0.01, d=0.4, and also
differed significantly in their negative interpretations,
t(137)=4.6, p<0.001, d=0.8. That is, positively trained
adolescents interpreted new ambiguous information signifi-
cantly more positively and less negatively than adolescents
in the placebo control condition, again indicating successful
modification of interpretations and showing generalization to
a new task containing new stimuli.
Moderation of Training Effects: The role of pre-training
trait anxiety and interpretive bias (Hypothesis 3)
To investigate differential effects of CBM-I for pre-training
level of trait anxiety, an ANOVA was performed in which
median split trait anxiety (median=29.0) was included as
a between-subjects factor in the analysis of the reaction
time and recognition task data. No significant effects
involving trait anxiety were found in the reaction time
data (p-values>0.27), while a significant Valence x Median
split trait anxiety effect was observed in the recognition task
data, F(1, 135)=5.8, p=0.02, ηp
2=0.04. An independent
samples t-test revealed that high anxious adolescents
interpreted ambiguous information more negative than low
anxious adolescents, t(137)=−2.2, p=0.03, d=0.4. No other
effects involving trait anxiety were significant (p-values>
0.12), including any interaction effects with Condition,
suggesting that CBM-I was equally effective in high and
low trait anxious adolescents.
Similarly, to examine whether pre-training level of
negative interpretive bias affected the CBM-I effects,
median split interpretive bias (recognition task; median=
0.14) was added as a between-subjects factor. Significant
effects of pre-existing interpretive bias on CBM-I effects
were observed. In the reaction time data, a significant pre-
training Interpretive bias (median split) x Condition x
Valence interaction effect was observed, F(1, 148)=4.2,
p=0.04, ηp
2=0.03 (see Fig. 1 and Table 2). To decompose
this interaction effect, we carried out separate analyses for
individuals with and without a negative interpretive bias at
pre-training. The Condition x Valence interaction effect was
only significant in individuals with a negative interpretive
bias at the start of the experiment, F(1, 80)=14.5, p<0.001,
ηp
2=0.15 (no negative bias F(1, 68)=0.5, p=0.47, ηp
2=
0.008). Within the sub-group of individuals with a negative
interpretive bias, it was shown that adolescents who had
followed the positive interpretive bias training were
significantly faster in solving positive probe word fragments
than adolescents who had followed the placebo-control
condition, t(80)=4.4, p<0.001, d=1.0 (no difference in
solving negative word fragments, t(80)=1.0, p=0.34,
d=0.2).
When median split interpretive bias (results at pre-test)
was added as an additional factor in the recognition task
analysis, the following interaction effects involving median
split interpretive bias were revealed; Interpretive Bias x
Valence, F(1, 135)=66.7, p<0.001, ηp
2=0.33; Interpretive
bias x Valence x Time, F(1, 135)=49.2, p<0.001,ηp
2=0.27;
Interpretive bias x Condition x Time, F(1, 135)=4.1,
Table 2 Mean scores on reaction time and recognition interpretive bias task (with standard deviations in parentheses)
Valence Positive training Placebo control condition
Negative bias No bias Total Negative bias No bias Total
Reaction times Positive 1262 (424) 1605 (527) 1401 (495) 1690 (461)
b 1534 (508) 1609 (489)
b
Negative 1548 (441) 1683 (524) 1602 (477)
c 1645 (447) 1544 (455) 1592 (465)
T1 Positive 1.9 (0.3) 2.6 (0.3) 2.2 (0.5) 2.1 (0.4) 2.4 (0.4) 2.3 (0.4)
Negative 2.6 (0.3) 2.1 (0.3) 2.4 (0.4) 2.7 (0.4) 2.0 (0.3) 2.3 (0.5)
Recognition task
a T2 Positive 2.6 (0.4) 2.6 (0.6) 2.6 (0.5) 2.3 (0.4)
b 2.5 (0.5) 2.4 (0.5)
b
Negative 2.0 (0.5) 2.0 (0.5) 2.0 (0.5) 2.5 (0.5)
b 2.3 (0.4) 2.4 (0.4)
b
aRecognition ratings ranged from 1 (very different)t o4( very similar);
bPositive training vs. placebo control condition means differ significantly (p≤0.01);
cPositive vs. negative word solution reaction time means differ significantly (p<0.001);
T1 = before CBM-I training, T2 = after CBM-I training.
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2=0.03; and most crucially a significant four-way
interaction effect: Interpretive bias x Condition x Valence x
Time, F(1, 135)=6.1, p=0.02, ηp
2=0.04 (see Table 2).
Follow-up analyses revealed that training was not effective
in modifying interpretationsin individualswho had no negative
interpretive bias, F(1, 63)=1.8, p=0.19, ηp
2=0.03, while
training was effective in individuals who had such a negative
interpretive bias, Condition x Valence x Time: F(1, 72)=26.4,
p<0.001, ηp
2=0.27. In the group of adolescents with a
negative interpretive bias at pre-test, adolescents who had
followed the positive training interpreted new ambiguous
information significantly more positive, t(72)=−3.4, p=0.001,
d=0.8, and significantly less negative, t(72)=4.3, p<0.001,
d=1.0, than adolescents with a negative interpretive bias at
pre-test who had received the placebo-control condition.
In sum, level of trait anxiety did not moderate the effects
of training. However, results from both the reaction time
data as well as the recognition task data suggested that level
of pre-training interpretive bias did moderate those effects.
Positive CBM-I appeared to be especially successful for
adolescents who had a negative interpretive bias at the start
of the experiment.
Effects on State Anxiety (Hypothesis 4)
To examine the impact of CBM-I on change in state
anxiety, a 2 (Condition) x 2 (Time: State anxiety before vs.
after training) x 2 (Gender) ANCOVA with age as a
covariate was conducted. Results revealed a significant
main effect of Gender, F(1, 143)=5.7, p=0.02, ηp
2=0.04,
and a main effect of Age, F(1, 143)=4.7, p=0.03, ηp
2=0.03,
reflecting relatively high levels of state anxiety for girls
and younger adolescents. The crucial Condition x Time
interaction effect was, however, not significant, F(1, 143)=
0.04, p>0.50, ηp
2<0.001, indicating that CBM-I had not
affected state anxiety.
Discussion
The current study was designed to experimentally test
whether a Cognitive Bias Modification procedure (CBM)
designed to modify threat-related interpretive biases has
effects on interpretations and anxiety in adolescents. The
adolescent age period is associated with an increase in
social anxiety (Westenberg et al. 2007) and it has been
argued that interpretive biases play a causal role in (social)
anxiety (Beck et al. 1985; Muris and Field 2008). Indeed,
there is empirical support that interpretive biases causally
influence anxiety in adults (Mathews and Mackintosh
2000), while in children it has been shown that expectancy
(interpretive) biases predict anxiety symptoms (Warren et al.
2000). The results of the present study showed that it is
possible to modify interpretations of ambiguous social
situations in a more positive direction in unselected
adolescents. Adolescents trained to interpret information
more positively were significantly quicker in solving positive
solutions of ambiguity than adolescents in the placebo-
control condition. In addition, when confronted with new
ambiguous information presented in a new task, adolescents
who followed the CBM-I training interpreted this informa-
tion more positively and less negatively than adolescents in
the control condition. This suggests that the trained
interpretive bias generalized to a new task. Subsequent
analyses revealed that the CBM-I training was especially
effective in adolescents who had a negative interpretive bias.
Gender did not moderate the effects of training, which is
consistent with earlier findings from CBM-I studies with
children (Muris et al. 2008; Vassilopoulos et al. 2009).
Meanwhile, gender was associated with both anxiety and
interpretive bias; female adolescents were more anxious and
had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguity negatively
than male adolescents (see also Muris et al. 2008). Note, that
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Fig. 1 Mean reaction times and
standard errors (in ms) to solve
positive and negative probes
during training depicted for each
condition (positive training vs.
placebo control condition) and
interpretive bias group (pre-
training negative bias vs. no
negative bias)
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interpretations in adolescents are in line with previous
findings in unselected children (Muris et al. 2008, 2009)
and unselected adults (Mathews and Mackintosh 2000). As
no effects on state anxiety were observed, state dependent
mood effects are an unlikely explanation for the differential
effects on interpretations. The finding that the more
vulnerable individuals were especially affected by the
modification procedure is also consistent with Muris et al.
(2008; but see Muris et al. 2009). However, vulnerable
children (i.e. highly anxious) in Muris et al. (2008) were
more affected by the negative interpretive bias training;
they acquired a stronger negative interpretive bias than low
anxious children. Note that the current findings paint a more
positive picture for vulnerable adolescents; adolescents with a
pre-training threat-related bias were more affected by the
positive training than adolescents without a threat-related
bias. This is a promising finding in the light of potential
application of CBM-I in clinically anxious adolescents. It
seems that individuals at risk (either highly anxious or
characterized by a negative interpretive bias) are more
susceptible to anxiety-relevant influences. While in a context
that encourages threat-related cognitions, their malleability
might result in stronger maladaptive threat-related cognitions,
in a context that encourages non-threatening cognitions,
their malleability might result in stronger adaptive cognitions.
This line of reasoning is consistent with recent theorizing
(differential susceptibility model, Belsky 2005) and gene by
environment interaction studies showing that certain children
are more affected, both for better and for worse, by their
environments (Belsky et al. 2007).
In the current study, CBM-I effects were observed on a
recognition task, indicating that the trained interpretive bias
generalized to a new task containing new ambiguous
stimuli. This is important as it shows that adolescents did not
learn a task-specific strategy or a task-specific interpretation
style, but that a more general interpretive style was acquired
that influenced the processing of new ambiguous information.
While the recognition task differs from the training procedure
in several aspects, there is also overlap. In both tasks,
ambiguous scenarios are presented, explicitly, in a written
format,andwithsentences appearingonebyone.Theobserved
e f f e c t so nt h er e c o g n i t i o nt a s kc o u l dt h e r e f o r eb es e e na s
evidenceofclosegeneralization.Futureresearchisnecessaryto
examine whether far generalization of the trained interpretive
bias can be observed. Interpretive bias tasks that deviate more
from the training procedure could be included in future studies;
for example using more visual, pictorial stimuli as faces or film
fragments (Amir et al. 2005), or real life social interaction
(Voncken and Bögels 2008).
Somewhat unexpectedly, no effects of CBM-I were
observed on state anxiety. The positively trained adoles-
cents were not less state anxious after training than the
adolescents in the placebo-control condition. This is
inconsistent with some of the earlier CBM-I studies in
unselected adults (Mathews and Mackintosh 2000; Salemink
et al. 2007b; Yiend et al. 2005,E x p1 ) .H o w e v e r ,t h e r ea r e
also studies failing to observe the effects on state anxiety in
unselected adults (Salemink et al. 2007a; Yiend et al. 2005,
Exp. 3). Several explanations for the lack of CBM-I effects
on state anxiety can be offered in relation to limitations of
the current study. First, absence of CBM-I effects on state
anxiety might be related to the fact that state anxiety was
assessed with the STAI-C questionnaire, which is a general
measure of anxious feelings and sensations. As the training
targeted dysfunctional thoughts regarding social situations,
the content of training does not match the content of the
questionnaire. A match between the training (social anxiety)
and the questionnaire could be achieved by measuring
specifically social anxiety (for example with the Social
Anxiety Scales for children and adolescents (SAS, La
Greca 1998).
Second, the lack of CBM-I effects on state anxiety could
also be related to the distinction between the concepts of
state anxiety and trait anxiety/anxiety vulnerability. Medi-
ation analyses of CBM-I effects have revealed that altered
interpretive bias was related to changes in trait anxiety,
while the altered interpretive bias was not related to
changes in state anxiety (Salemink et al. 2010b). This
suggests that it is important to examine CBM-I effects on
trait anxiety and not (only) state anxiety. As trait anxiety
has been conceptualized as the tendency to react anxiously
to a stressor (Bakker et al. 1989; Spielberger 1973),
including a stress task containing ambiguity after CBM-I
might reveal differential mood effects. Support for this
hypothesis has been observed in adults (Mackintosh et al.
2006; Wilson et al. 2006). Participants received a stress task
following CBM-I. The stress task consisted of different
video clips depicting real-life rescue operations that
contained ambiguity, as the outcome of the event remained
ambiguous until a clip’s final seconds. Results revealed that
in both studies, exposure to positive training was associated
with less increase in anxiety in response to viewing the
stressful accident videos. This is corroborated by findings
from cognitive bias modification of attentional bias showing
that such a training did not affect state anxiety directly in
unselected individuals, but affected stress vulnerability
(for children see Eldar et al. 2008; for adults see Macleod
et al. 2002).
Third, the lack of CBM-I effects on state anxiety might
be related to the role of imagery. Research has shown that
mental imagery plays an important role in information
processing and emotions (Holmes and Mathews 2005;
Holmes et al. 2006). In the current study, participants were
instructed to imagine the described situations. However the
instructions were minimal and there was no practice in
974 J Abnorm Child Psychol (2011) 39:967–976vividly imagining the scenarios. Increasing the use of
imagery during CBM-I training might be relevant to obtain
effects on anxiety (cf. Lothmann et al. 2011).
Fourth, participants were unselected adolescents with an
average level of anxious feelings (mean STAI-C trait and
state scores between 4th and 6th decile). Compared to
highly anxious adolescents, there is less room for CBM-I to
reduce anxious feelings. Future studies might add, on the
one hand, an assessment of positive emotions and self-
esteem as positive CBM training might be associated with
an increase in positive feelings (Dandeneau et al. 2007),
and on the other hand, CBM-I training might be applied to
highly anxious adolescents or clinically anxious adolescents
who have higher levels of anxiety and interpretive bias and
therefore more room for improvement in both cognitions
and mood (Murphy et al. 2007; Vassilopoulos et al. 2009).
In addition, participants received a single session of
interpretation training. Multiple sessions of training spaced
over several days might be necessary for anxiolytic effects
to occur (Mathews et al. 2007; Salemink et al. 2009;
Vassilopoulos et al. 2009). Future studies could examine
the effects of multiple sessions of training and examine the
duration of the training effects. The inclusion of booster
sessions might optimize effects when results show that
effects diminish over time.
Finally, the absence of training effects on anxiety could
also be due to the possibility that in adolescents interpre-
tations are not causally related to anxiety (see for example
Alfano et al. 2002 for divergent findings regarding the role
of cognitions in childhood anxiety). Future research is
necessary to investigate more closely the (causal) relation-
ship between anxiety and cognitions in adolescents.
Insum,CBM-Iwassuccessfulinmodifyinginterpretations
in unselected adolescents and stronger effects were observed
inindividuals who had a threat-relatedinterpretivebiasatpre-
test. These findings are promising when considering training
adolescents at risk or adolescents with a clinical diagnosis to
interpret ambiguity more positively. Future prevention and
intervention trials are necessary to test the long-term clinical
and preventative effects of the CBM-I training more rigor-
ously. Note that on-line versions of the training could be
developed that could contribute to the problem of long
waiting lists and individuals who avoid seeking treatment
due to shame or fear of stigmatization. Such a technological
innovation could have 24/7 availability and has the potential
to be widely disseminated in a way that just is not possible
with other types of prevention or intervention programs.
However, future studies are required to examine the effects of
CBM-Ionmoodandvulnerabilityasnoeffectswereobserved
on state anxiety in the current study.
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